Animal Communication, 2000 word 2.2 degree essay

ANIMALCOMMUNICATION

Signals given in the animal kingdom are never honest

 

Animal communication could be considered anything that conveys some meaning or intelligence to other animals. Zoo semiotics today is part of nature ecology, environmentalism, and animal sociology and cognition. Understanding animal behaviour, conversational patterns and the psychological and traditional compulsions behind their behaviour is increasingly becoming an important educational field of study. These communications reflect the difficulties, fears, anxieties, identities, physical illness, pain, trauma, stress disorder and calls for rescue by animals. Signals could be reliable or deceptive according to the circumstances and the needs of the sender. This area was, until recently, little explored, but it now has been accepted that the animal world is full of deceitful signals targeting the receiver, or sometimes a third party. All such deceitful signals could be seen to be for the benefit of the sender and to be motivated by some reward to the animal. Scholars in the field now accept that animals are capable of deceit just like humans, and animals behave in such ways ultimately for their survival and benefit.

 

There are many biological signalling models in deceitful communications. There are areas of communication when the interests of the involved parties overlap or diverge, or both, and this could result in distorted or mistaken signals, though these arguably cannot be termed as absolutely deceitful. Signalling that is deceitful can happen when the interests are in opposition or conflict, especially between the sexes. This study will attempt to address how reliable these signals are, how they are interacted, to what extent they are perceived as deceitful signals, how the receivers respond to the deceit, to what extent they convey information, what costs such signals incur, and what are the uses of deceptive communications. It also examines how these signals could result in changes in the broader social environment. The main focus is on the deception and honesty in animal world communication and how it operates in contexts such as mating, parenting, and potentially dangerous situations linked to survival. Most social relationships depend on the reactions to others’ movements and this is a highly developed tendency as animals are instinctively sensitive to the slightest of the signs. (Tinbergen, 1953, p.54).

 

Animal communication has been observed for centuries, but as a branch of educational study, it has developed greatly in recent years. The information sent by the caller and received by the receiver, which should be called a signal, is the main crux of communication. The process involves either two or more individuals. Usually the communication is between two individuals, which could observed by another or more, or which may be taken advantage of by a third party, (for example, a predator), or which may harm or benefit another party. There are instances of the sender sending purposeful misinformation and, particularly in more vulnerable species, honest communication is seemingly dominated by misinformation. This is possibly because of the animals’ vulnerability and the need for ‘cunning’ for these species to survive and flourish under difficult circumstances. Contrary to much earlier knowledge, it is now accepted that the deceitful communication has long been intrinsically intertwined with evolutionary developments, promoting the survival of those animals who  adopt such behaviours.

 

The deceitful production of sound, just as the genuine, depends on the production of vibrations. Naturally, terrestrial animals and aquatic animals have varieties of sound production systems and they are very rarely identical though can share many features. Sound propagation could be engaged in purposely with the express intention of deceiving the receiver. As with all sound production, absorption, scattering, boundary reflections, refraction, spectral changes, and reverberations can lead to pattern loss. Animals can decide to reduce or increase the distortions at will and depending on the type of signal. This illustrates the animal capability of modification and alteration of the signals according to necessity. An animal or bird producing such deceitful signalling is seemingly fully aware of its deceit, though may simply be engaging in evolutionary instinct. Some signalling could arguably be lost under adverse circumstances. Effective signalling depends on sound reception, light requisites, visibility, sense, hearing, physical constraints, resonant frequencies, light through different media and boundaries, light and matter interaction, colours, intensity and so on, and it is something of a difficult challenge for any animals to have all of them in correct balance at all times.  Communication efficiency could be affected by noise, self-interference, environmental degradation and nonspecific interference. (Espmark, 2000, p.24).

 

Animal communication, as mentioned earlier, could be deceitful and sometimes potentially dangerous and detrimental to the animal’s survival. Signal honesty cannot perhaps be expected beyond a certain limit from animal species, because, to a particular sender, it could merely be instinctive behaviour subconsciously produced. If there is a conflict of interest and the situation demands it, the signals forsake honesty and become deceitful. For example, a situation of a courting pair where the male benefits by mating regardless of his suitability, (Bradbury, 1998, p.649). Here a deceitful signal rather tha honesty would perhaps not be effective. Perhaps if honesty were seen against cheating in communication, the deceitful behaviour would prove more effective and that is why it is observed so regularly used by animals for their own benefit. Such behaviour exhibits survival instinct in the sender and the naïve acceptance of the receiver. In such a way, deceit implies to receiver an error and the reverse need not be true, (Bradbury, p.650). Because in the opposite case, the sender could be engaging in honest communication and the receiver, for their benefit, may be distorting it and receiving its deceitful version. Here the value of the signal may be negative for the sender, while for the receiver it is positive. (ibid).  Naïve acceptance can lead to various losses, injury or death, although it need not harm the sender who has done so with the full knowledge of possible results. This shows that the animal kingdom could be schemers when they choose to be so. Communicating one’s emotional status to others is the main function of animal communication and this is in line with Darwin’s major findings, (Hauser, 1999, p.5).

 

Honest signalling happens when the sender is certain of their needs and there are no competitors. Alternatively, it could be a clear case of fear and danger, where the honest signal depicts the urgent need of assistance and guidance. Moreover, in the case of mating, where it goes uncontested, and both the sexes are sure of their respective partners, much of the signalling is intrinsically honest. Many earlier ecological studies believed that animal signals were all honest, but we know now that this is not the case, because any sender not exploiting the benefits of deceitful communication for advantage could be exploited and deprived by a conniving receiver, (Bradbury, p.651). Honest signalling is perhaps the most appreciated action of the animal world so has deceit in behaviour was possible ignored due to human bias. Honesty is considered to be ecological and social and somehow, it was accepted that every signal is honest and expressed a certain genuine need for happiness. For example, when a bird is singing, it could possibly be difficult to realise that it could be sending a deceitful signal that would be gratifying to the bird and bode danger to the receiver. This does not mean that there is no genuine signalling in the animals, but animals cannot afford to be genuine at all occasions and thus deceitful behaviours have evolved.

 

There is both honesty and dishonesty in animal courtship rituals too. Much depends on female choice and motives, but the male may also hope for a particular female, disregarding other females too. Matters of hierarchy and rank are intrinsic to the process too, though what constitutes rank may well vary in the male and the female. Females have various reasons for their choice of mate. The choice need not be always the same for each individual female, and varying individuals could have diverse reasons for choosing a particular mate, depending on, for example, the chances of survival of her future offspring, the certainty of the male’s capacity to look after the family group, the possibilities of survival in multifarious ways, and the constant striving for good genes for the offspring. The decision will depend on all the ‘pros and cons’ from the female’s point of view, and much depends on the female choice of a mate. For the right choice, she would send honest signals for the male she selects, and deceitful signals to other unwanted males who she has already perhaps rejected and wishes to disperse without their ‘bothering’ her any more. This means she may be sending both genuine and deceitful signals almost simultaneously, hoping that the genuine signal would be picked up by her intended male and the deceitful signals would be received by the unwanted males in the area, who would interpret it in their own way and go in search of other available females. She will try to minimise conflict which may harm her, and here such intentions depend on the clever signalling of the female and the naïve acceptance of these signals by her suitors. This is why it is considered that the deceit signal always results in the loss of something for the receiver. This could be simply losing one opportunity for food, or could result in the loss of life. This can be the case with  males too, who have their own preferences and needs: they have strategic signalling to achieve their ends, but may not always be successful in their attempts. As with females, this deceitful signalling strategy may or may not not work in their favour. The deceit is always a means to the desired end and, in terms of sexual selection, deceitful signalling has  immense significance.

 

There are many kinds of costs involved in all animal behaviours. For honest courtship signalling, male fitness and status is paramount and this may means there is a fitness cost involved. Higher quality tends ot mean greater fitness, and sometimes this is reflected in ‘badge wearing’. The badge wearing male is expected to have the corresponding capabilities to win his coveted positions, because females could use the badge size or colour as an indicator of his health, virility or strength, although the male may transmit signals advertising status and strength he does not possess. The same principle can apply to honesty and begging, where certain actions of the receiver would benefit the sender. There can be errors and evolutionary signals and these could adversely affect the honesty of the sender. Another case of distortion of aim and purpose in signalling could occur where there are multiple senders and a single receiver. This once again could have a cost for the receiver in ‘honouring’ such begging.

 

Deceit also could be the provision of incorrect sender information which has a positive value for the sender, but a negative one for the receiver, (Bradbury, p.674). Deceits could include lies, not expressing all the information and/or withholding part of it with the intention of self-gratification, not signalling when needed and signalling when it is beneficial to self, exaggerating a situation beyond truth, bluffing by indicating something that does not exist, (for example, rank), using attenuators making it more difficult for the receiver to understand and interpret intentions of the signal-transmitter.

 

The signal costs could be assessed in terms of energy, performance, development and also the costs in terms of communication received by third parties who are unconnected to the initial communication intent. The value of the signals determines the sender’s and the receiver’s involvement in it. It is difficult to assess this value before the signal is sent and received from the other end. Also, it connects to the common interest of the sender and the receiver. This does not mean that signalling cannot happen if such common interest does not exist. The receiver may suffer an incidental cost by receiving the signal whether he is receptive or not. Even erroneous decisions, defaults, errors, wrong intentions may result in a cost from sometimes both the sender and the receiver. Incidental costs will prevail if there is a sender-receiver conflict.

 

There are sender necessary costs that cannot be avoided and this includes the visual conspicuousness cost to predators and parasites: by making his presence seen or heard an animal may expose himself to danger or unwanted attention.  The long-distance sender, who signals continuously and noisily, can suffer a very high risk of being noticed and attacked by a predator which is equivalent to the danger of a visual sender, (Bradbury, p.546).

 

In addition, there could be olfactory conspicuousness costs by leaving a trail that could be followed by a predator. There are energetic costs of signalling, which are usually combined with visual signals for the territory or the mate. Auditory signals could attract attention and make the sender lose energy and time. Chemical signals can lead to bodily costs and expense, as the production of the signal is metabolically connected. Sender constraints enhance the sender incidental costs. There are receiver costs too which can be seen in the form of harassment and vulnerability to predation and  time costs. The receiver’s incidental costs could be high if the signals are deceit. Receivers also suffer from phylogenetic constraints, especially visual receivers. Auditory receivers too can suffer, but to a lesser degree. Chemical receivers can suffer from memory constraints and other transmission constraints could be dangerous to receivers. The costs could be sustantial. However, the sender’s costs are considered to be higher in genuine signalling, whereas, the receiver’s costs could be considerably higher in deceit. Visual communication has the constraint of the receiver’s eye capability, while the auditory communication has a wider range. Chemical communication is the least costly as it is usually intended to be ‘picked up’ by individuals in the immediate vicinity.

 

The importance of communication, genuine or otherwise, does not reside solely with the sender. The response of the receiver is as important as the communication sent by the sender without which communication could be lost and scarce resources wasted. There are various approaches to studying the communication, for example acoustic signalling by humpback whales. Some studies are also conducted with reference to the costs and benefits of sexual calls, their balance and breadth, and visual signalling. Studying the production, transmission and the signal receptions is an intricate science. The properties of these sounds and their longitudinal and transverse waves and the sound pressures create some of the difference between genuine and deceit calls, though they are not always recognisable. This also applies to the sound intensity and the effects of sound propagation. The spreading of the sound and the inherent loss therein, medium absorption reflective and interactive scattering are different to some extent from call to call, species to species. Emergency signals could be deceitful too, and on occasion they are compound and periodic signals.

 

In conclusion, it could be argued that animal communication can either be honest or dishonest, but that the individual transmitting the signal will always benefit in some way through either behaviour.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

  1. Bradbury, Jack W. and Vehrencamp, Sandra L. (1998), Principles of Animal Communication, Sunderland, Sinauer Associates.
  2. Espmark, Yngve et al (2000), Animal Signals, Trodheim, Tapir Academic Press.
  3. Hauser, Marc D. and Konishi, Mark (1999), The Design of Animal Communication, Cambridge, MIT Press.
  4. Tinbergen, N. (1953), Social Behaviour in Animals, London, Methuen.

 

 

 

 

ONLINE SOURCES

 

 

  1. http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/314/5801/927/F1