Animal Communication, degree essay 2.2

ANIMALCOMMUNICATION

 

 

 

Signals given in the animal kingdom are never honest

 

Animal communication could be considered anything that conveys some meaning or intelligence to other animals. Zoo semiotics today is part of nature ecology, environmentalism, and animal sociology and cognition. Understanding animal behaviour, conversational patterns and the psychological and traditional compulsions behind their behaviour is increasingly becoming an important educational field of study. These communications reflect the difficulties, fears, anxieties, identities, physical illness, pain, trauma, stress disorder and calls for rescue by animals. Signals could be reliable or deceptive according to the circumstances and the needs of the sender. This area was, until recently, little explored, but it now has been accepted that the animal world is full of deceitful signals targeting the receiver, or sometimes a third party. All such deceitful signals could be seen to be for the benefit of the sender and to be motivated by some reward to the animal. Scholars in the field now accept that animals are capable of deceit just like humans, and animals behave in such ways ultimately for their survival and benefit and most of the signals are a mixture of honesty and deceit.

 

There are many biological signalling models in deceitful communications. There are areas of communication when the interests of the involved parties overlap or diverge, or both and this could result in distorted or mistaken signals, though these arguably cannot be termed as absolutely deceitful. Signalling that is deceitful can happen when the interests are in opposition or conflict, especially between the sexes. This study will attempt to address how reliable these signals are, how they are interacted, to what extent they are perceived as deceitful signals, how the receivers respond to the deceit, to what extent they convey information, what costs such signals incur, and what are the uses of deceptive communications. It also examines how these signals could result in changes in the broader social environment. The main focus is on the deception and honesty in animal world communication and how it operates in contexts such as mating, parenting, and potentially dangerous situations linked to survival. “The Principal patterns which are coordinated in this way are those of next building, retrieval, licking and caring for the young, feeding and maintaining contact with them as well as showing an aggressive response to intruders,” (Dimond, 1970, p.57).

The information sent by the caller and received by the receiver, which should be called a signal, is the main crux of communication. The process involves either two or more individuals. Usually the communication is between two individuals, which could observed by another or more, or which may be taken advantage of by a third party, (for example, a predator), or which may harm or benefit another party. There are instances of the sender sending purposeful misinformation and, particularly in more vulnerable species, honest communication is seemingly dominated by misinformation. This is possibly because of the animals’ vulnerability and the need for ‘cunning’ for these species to survive and flourish under difficult circumstances. Contrary to the earlier knowledge, it is now accepted that the deceitful communication has long been intrinsically intertwined with evolutionary developments, promoting the survival of those animals who adopt such behaviours and very often, they could be the mixture of opposites. “The twin concepts of reliability and deception would appear to present an evolutionary paradox for animal communication systems. On one hand, signals should be reliable indicators of a signaler’s intentions or quality; otherwise, receivers should ignore these signals and over evolutionary time unreliable signals would disappear. On the other hand, signalers should benefit in many contexts by masking their true intentions or exaggerating their quality, leading to selection for deceptive signals,” (Wright, 2006, p,189). .

 

 

The deceitful production of sound, just as the genuine, depends on the production of vibrations. Naturally, terrestrial animals and aquatic animals have varieties of sound production systems and they are very rarely identical though can share many features. Sound propagation could be engaged in purposely with the express intention of deceiving the receiver. As with all sound production, absorption, scattering, boundary reflections, refraction, spectral changes, and reverberations can lead to pattern loss. Animals can decide to reduce or increase the distortions at will and depending on the type of signal. This illustrates the animal capability of modification and alteration of the signals according to necessity. An animal or bird producing such deceitful signalling is seemingly fully aware of its deceit, though may simply be engaging in evolutionary instinct. Some signalling could arguably be lost under adverse circumstances. Effective signalling depends on sound reception, light requisites, visibility, sense, hearing, physical constraints, resonant frequencies, light through different media and boundaries, light and matter interaction, colours, intensity and so on, and it is something of a difficult challenge for any animals to have all of them in correct balance at all times.  In addition to deceiving others, another remarkable tendency that could be found here, is the self-deception, which is, keeping the truth away from the conscious mind. This can result in unconscious deceitful signals. “By becoming unconscious of its deception, the deceiver hides these signs from the observer. He or she can lie without the nervousness that accompanies deception,” (Trivers, 1985, p.406).

 

Animal communication, as mentioned earlier, could be deceitful and sometimes potentially dangerous and detrimental to the animal’s survival. Signal honesty cannot perhaps be expected beyond a certain limit from animal species, because, to a particular sender, it could merely be instinctive behaviour subconsciously produced. If there is a conflict of interest and the situation demands it, the signals forsake honesty and become deceitful. For example, Bradbury asks us to “…consider a courting pair in which the male benefits by mating regardless of his suitability, whereas the female prefers to mate only if the male meets certain criteria,” (Bradbury, 1998, p.649). Here a deceitful signal rather than honesty would perhaps not be effective. Perhaps if honesty were seen against cheating in communication, the deceitful behaviour would prove more effective and that is why it is observed so regularly used by animals for their own benefit. Such behaviour exhibits survival instinct in the sender and the naïve acceptance of the receiver. “Deceit thus implies receiver error. It is important to note that the reverse is not necessarily true and receiver error is not a useful indication of deceit”, (Dawkins 1993, in Bradbury, p.650-651). Because in the opposite case, the sender could be engaging in honest communication and the receiver, for their benefit, may be distorting it and receiving its deceitful version. “As a result, receiver error is nearly always a part of optimal communication strategies; how much error is tolerated will depend on phylogenetic and physiological limits on signal design, the costs of encoding, decoding..” (Ibid, 651).  Naïve acceptance can lead to various losses, injury or death, although it need not harm the sender who has done so with the full knowledge of possible results. This shows that the animals can be ‘schemers’ when they choose to be so. “Almost all the million or so species of animals have communication systems of one kind or another which are tailored to the particular needs of that species and which organize interactions between individuals,” (Lewis, 1980, pp. 5-6).

 

Honest signalling happens when the sender is certain of their needs and there are no competitors. Alternatively, it could be a clear case of fear and danger, where the honest signal depicts the urgent need of assistance and guidance. Moreover, in the case of mating, where it goes uncontested, and both the sexes are sure of their respective partners, much of the signalling is intrinsically honest. Many earlier ecological studies believed that animal signals were all honest, but we know now that this is not the case, because any sender not exploiting the benefits of deceitful communication for advantage could be exploited and deprived by a conniving receiver. “Again, the best indicator of cheating is a difference in the sign of the values of information for the two parties, (Bradbury, p.651). Honest signalling is perhaps the most appreciated action of the animal world so deceit in behaviour was possibly ignored due to human bias. Honesty is considered to be ecological and social and somehow, it was accepted that every signal is honest and expressed a certain genuine need for happiness. For example, when a bird is singing, it could possibly be difficult to realise that it could be sending a deceitful signal that would be gratifying to the bird and bode danger to the receiver. This does not mean that there is no genuine signalling in animals, but they cannot afford to be genuine on all occasions and thus deceitful behaviours have evolved. “In 1983, researchers found that a prawnlike Caribbean stomatopod that has just molted still threatens intruders by waving a claw. That claw is too soft and weak for a fight, yet the threat often works,” says Milius (2000). Similarly, many black and yellow insects such as the hoverfly may benefit from their resemblance to wasps and other stinging black and yellow insects.

 

 

There is both honesty and dishonesty in animal courtship rituals too. Much depends on female choice and motives, but the male may also hope for a particular female, disregarding other females too. Matters of hierarchy and rank are intrinsic to the process too, though what constitutes rank may well vary in the male and the female. Females have various reasons for their choice of mate. The choice need not be always the same for each individual female, and varying individuals could have diverse reasons for choosing a particular mate, depending on, for example, the chances of survival of her future offspring, the certainty of the male’s capacity to look after the family group, the possibilities of survival in multifarious ways, and the constant striving for good genes for the offspring. The decision will depend on all the ‘pros and cons’ from the female’s point of view, and much depends on the female choice of a mate. For the right choice, she would send honest signals for the male she selects, and deceitful signals to other unwanted males who she has already perhaps rejected and wishes to disperse without their ‘bothering’ her any more. This means she may be sending both genuine and deceitful signals almost simultaneously, hoping that the genuine signal would be picked up by her intended male and the deceitful signals would be received by the unwanted males in the area, who would interpret it in their own way and go in search of other available females. She will try to minimise conflict which may harm her, and here such intentions depend on the clever signalling of the female and the naïve acceptance of these signals by her suitors. This is why it is considered that the deceit signal always results in the loss of something for the receiver. This could be simply losing one opportunity for food, or could result in the loss of life. This can be the case with males too, who have their own preferences and needs: they have strategic signalling to achieve their ends, but may not always be successful in their attempts. As with females, this deceitful signalling strategy may or may not work in their favour. The deceit is always a means to the desired end and, in terms of sexual selection, deceitful signalling has immense significance. One argument suggests that natural selection dominates  signalling. “Honest signals in communication are given when both the sender and receiver have the same interest in the result. Deceit comes about when one animal can exploit another in order to improve its fitness,” Deceit versus honest signalling, http://www.animalbehavioronline.com/deceit.html

 

There are many kinds of costs involved in all animal behaviours. For honest courtship signalling, male fitness and status is paramount and this may means there is a fitness cost involved. Higher quality tends to mean greater fitness, and sometimes this is reflected in ‘badge wearing’. The badge wearing male is expected to have the corresponding capabilities to win his coveted positions, because females could use the badge size or colour as an indicator of his health, virility or strength, although the male may transmit signals advertising status and strength he does not possess. The same principle can apply to honesty and begging, where certain actions of the receiver would benefit the sender. There can be errors and evolutionary signals and these could adversely affect the honesty of the sender. Another case of distortion of aim and purpose in signalling could occur where there are multiple senders and a single receiver. This once again could have a cost for the receiver in ‘honouring’ such begging. “Deceit is the provision of inaccurate information by a sender to a receiver. It is associated with a positive value of information for the sender, but a negative value for the receiver,” (Bradbury, p.674). Deceits could include lies, not expressing all the information and/or withholding part of it with the intention of self-gratification, not signalling when needed and signalling when it is beneficial to self, exaggerating a situation beyond truth, bluffing by indicating something that does not exist, (for example, rank), using attenuators making it more difficult for the receiver to understand and interpret intentions of the signal-transmitter. “Hidden preferences and the sensory exploitation are thus likely to have an enduring influence on the evolution of honest, costly signals. At the same time, honest and costs are prerequisites for the evolution of exploitation. When signalling is cost free, selection cannot act to maintain honesty and receivers rapidly evolve to ignore signals. This leads to a reduction in the extent of hidden preference, and a consequent loss of potential for exploitation,” argues Krakauer, (1995).

 

The signal costs could be assessed in terms of energy, performance, development and also the costs in terms of communication received by third parties who are unconnected to the initial communication intent. The value of the signals determines the sender’s and the receiver’s involvement in it. It is difficult to assess this value before the signal is sent and received from the other end. Also, it connects to the common interest of the sender and the receiver. This does not mean that signalling cannot happen if such common interest does not exist. The receiver may suffer an incidental cost by receiving the signal whether he is receptive or not. Even erroneous decisions, defaults, errors, wrong intentions may result in a cost from sometimes both the sender and the receiver. Incidental costs will prevail if there is a sender-receiver conflict. There are sender necessary costs that cannot be avoided and this includes the visual conspicuousness cost to predators and parasites: by making his presence seen or heard an animal may expose himself to danger or unwanted attention.  “The long-distance, continuous auditory sender suffers nearly as high a risk of being localized by a predator as an equivalent visual sender,” (Bradbury, p.546).

In addition, there could be olfactory conspicuousness costs by leaving a trail that could be followed by a predator. There are energetic costs of signalling, which are usually combined with visual signals for the territory or the mate. Auditory signals could attract attention and make the sender lose energy and time. Chemical signals can lead to bodily costs and expense, as the production of the signal is metabolically connected. Sender constraints enhance the sender incidental costs. There are receiver costs too which can be seen in the form of harassment and vulnerability to predation and time costs. The receiver’s incidental costs could be high if the signals are deceit. Receivers also suffer from phylogenetic constraints, especially visual receivers. Auditory receivers too can suffer, but to a lesser degree. Chemical receivers can suffer from memory constraints and other transmission constraints could be dangerous to receivers. The costs could be substantial. However, the sender’s costs are considered to be higher in genuine signalling, whereas, the receiver’s costs could be considerably higher in deceit. Visual communication has the constraint of the receiver’s eye capability, while the auditory communication has a wider range. Chemical communication is the least costly as it is usually intended to be ‘picked up’ by individuals in the immediate vicinity.

 

The importance of communication, genuine or otherwise, does not reside solely with the sender. The response of the receiver is as important as the communication sent by the sender without which communication could be lost and scarce resources wasted. There are various approaches to studying the communication, for example acoustic signalling by humpback whales. Some studies are also conducted with reference to the costs and benefits of sexual calls, their balance and breadth, and visual signalling. Studying the production, transmission and the signal receptions is an intricate science. The properties of these sounds and their longitudinal and transverse waves and the sound pressures create some of the difference between genuine and deceit calls, though they are not always recognisable. This also applies to the sound intensity and the effects of sound propagation. The spreading of the sound and the inherent loss therein, medium absorption reflective and interactive scattering are different to some extent from call to call, species to species. Emergency signals could be deceitful too, and on occasion they are compound and periodic signals.

 

In conclusion, it could be argued that animal communication can either be honest or dishonest, but that the individual transmitting the signal will always benefit in some way through either behaviour. With the available research, it could be deduced that deceit is very often used by animals either as stand-alone or mixed with honesty in the field of communication. As known in recent years, it is safe to conclude that deceit is part of animal world signalling and very often dominates the entire area of animal communication.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

  1. Bradbury, Jack W. and Vehrencamp, Sandra L. (1998), Principles of Animal Communication, Sunderland, Sinauer Associates.
  2. Dimond, Stuart J. (1970), The Social Behaviour of Animals, London, B.T. Batsford Ltd.
  3. Krakauer, David C. and Johnstone, Rufus A. (1995), ‘The Evolution of Exploitation and Honesty in Animal Communication: A Model Using Artificial Neural Networks’, Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, Volume 348, Issue 1325, pp. 355-361.
  4. Lewis, D. Brian and Gower, D. Michael (1980), Biology of Communication, Blackie, Glasgow.
  5. Milius, S. (2000), ‘The truth is, frogs bluff and crabs cheat – deceit in animal behavior’, Science News, April 22nd, 2000.
  6. Trivers, Robert (1985), Social Evolution, The Benjamin, Reading, Massachusetts.
  7. Wright, Timothy (2006), ‘The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems’, Bio One, 108, Issue 4, November 2006.

 

ONLINE SOURCES

 

 

  1. http://www.animalbehavioronline.com/deceit.html accessed 5/1/08.