Introduction
The task at hand requires the author to explore and critically analyse the role of the Project Manager and the Project Management team in the organisation of two real scenarios in recent construction history. The paragraphs below will, to further this aim, explore the factors which have contributed to the success of this project from a managerial and organisational perspective.
The author feels that a detailed discussion of all the nine “ingredients” which could contribute to possible success of such a venture are beyond the scope of this discussion. Therefore, in line with the advice in the essay question and for the sake of coherence and precision, the author will only discuss some of the most significant factors that are at the premise of the success or failure of both projects. More importantly, these ingredients will be discussed in the context of good and bad practice in the management of the construction phase of these projects in terms of the essential skills and managerial functions which are hallmarks of successful project management.
The Spinnaker Tower
The Spinnaker Tower in Portsmouth is often cited as a blatant example of project management failure in terms of the costs, lost profits and subsequent bad business reputation in the UK construction management industry (Griffiths, 2004). The project ended in a five year delay and massive corporate controversy as it was originally supposed to be unveiled at the millennium but was completed only recently, in 2005 (Griffiths, 2004). The main reason cited was a planning failure on behalf of the city councillors and the greed and incompetence of the relevant project managers involved (Griffiths, 2004).
The UK construction industry has recently learnt many a significant lesson in terms of the damage bad decision making by project managers – in terms of the quality, finances, timing and control of project management – can wreak upon an otherwise lucrative and promising construction venture. Examples of these are the London Eye, the Bath Spa project and the Cardiff Millennium Centre to name a few (White and Fortune, 2009).
A more significant and recent example of public sector project failure is the Spinnaker tower project (better known as the Millennium Tower), the outcome of which was meant to have massive emotive significance for Britain’s celebration of the millennium. This symbol of “Renaissance” (Griffiths, 2004) had a budget of £86m and was set up in 1995; by Spring 1996, prospective bidders were to be finalized and the tower was meant to be complete by Autumn 1999 after commencement of construction around Winter 1998 (Griffiths, 2004). At the outset, the choice of contractors for this project was found to be very controversial as large contractors like Wilford and Santiago were turned down, and instead Berkeley Developers and HGP (Greenchurch Allchurch Evans) architects were chosen (Griffiths, 2004). The choice of architects by Berkeley has been shrouded in mystery ever since, as these architects seemed to have had no previous experience in building towers (Griffiths, 2004). Not surprisingly, a year later, Berkeley facing delays, an unrealistic tower design and erroneous cost estimates, withdrew from the contract and PSTL, another consortium of builders took over. A few months later, PSTL too was sacked due to extremely irresponsible management behaviour. Finally, in 2000 Mowlem were appointed for the completion of the project (Griffiths, 2004).
In retrospect, a number of project management lapses can be observed in the Spinnaker saga especially in terms of the instability of decision-making right from the point where the choice of architects was made (Clough et al, 2000). Berkeley effectively failed to retain control as the costs of the project spiralled out of control and time management became a lost cause. There was an overall lack of control methodologies whereas there was a “desert and run” situation by the project managers involved in the end (Couillard, 1995:7).
Secondly, there were complaints of a lack of quality management as well as the fulfilment of the essential quality standards for the performance of the project. In this, quality control suffered as project managers from all three contractors involved in the construction made numerous defective decisions pertaining to the procurement and monitoring of quality control, which was evident from the fact that later on a lot of rework was needed as the new building seemed to have an exterior which was falling apart and appeared shabby even before the building was unveiled (Baldry, 1998). Quality control or the lack thereof has been cited as the primary reason for project success or failure (Atkinson et al, 2006).
Last but not least, the Spinnaker saga was the result of extremely defective project procurement management due to delays and unrealistic choices of contractors and subsequent administration of the same (White and Fortune, 2009). This was fairly evident from the fact that the design and architecture of the tower was delegated to architects who had no experience in the field (Griffiths, 2004). On behalf of the city council, there was a failure to seek proper and professional help when allocating work to possible bidders. The management regimes of PSTL and Berkeley both suffered as their project managers fell behind in getting timely approval of funding from the Millennium commission for the first two years of the bidding approval (Griffiths, 2004). Best practice in this regard should have had been on behalf of Berkeley to refuse the time limit provided after there was a two year delay in funding (Cicmil et al, 2006). Instead, the project managers negligently accepted the work, (due to begin in 1996), in 1998 which gave them just one year to complete the project in Autumn 1999, which was unrealistic to say the least. Furthermore, the project managers on behalf of the City Council, Berkeley and PSTL, ignored the need to negotiate and clarify the parameters of protective legal and accounting measures against cost escalation (Griffiths, 2004). This resulted in a heavy financial burden on the Millennium Commission and the City Council later on to face the legal and contractual burdens of the delays and project failures. More delays almost two years long were faced as the project managers of PSTL and Berkeley bickered amongst themselves over site access and infrastructure wrap up (Griffiths, 2004). Delay was increased by the fact that the project managers of PSTL ignored other legal intricacies as access and withdrawal issues were ignored as well as the integral intellectual property issues pertaining to the image rights of Spinnaker.
St Pancras railway station
While the fate of the Spinnaker as a shiny epitome of Britain’s millennium crossover was hijacked by bad decisions and financial greed of its project managers, St Pancras Railway station’s rebuilding, refurbishment and expansion which began in 1996 has been hailed by many as one of the better examples of industrial practice in the construction industry (Muir, 2008). Today, the very much modernized and technologically advanced St Pancras stands as a scintillating example of good workmanship in comparison to its international rivals (Muir, 2008). The project was technology intensive, and thus its project management was carefully conducted through IT intensive means with careful use of the integration of information and IT systems into its construction phases (Muir, 2008).
Briefly, in 1996, which was around the same time as the Spinnaker tower was set up for construction bidding, London and Continental Railways (LCR) were allocated the task of building and operating the Eurostar International Train Service (PTS, 2009). This project was an example of a public and private consortium of companies in a bid to combine public funding with the cost effectiveness and expertise of the private sector (PTS, 2009). The target was realistically set for a decade by its various project managers within LCR, its subsidiaries and other business partners. The division of labour at the outset allowed more time for decision making to project managers, who immediately stressed an IT intensive means to an end of achieving successful reconstruction of St Pancras in time to save costs and to have the Eurostar up and running (PTS, 2009). It should also be remembered that one of the main construction challenges of this project was to retain the usability of the station, as well as to cause the least inconvenience to the current railway customer base and the adjoining buildings.
Another issue was retaining the constructional and structural integrity of the ancient single arch span of St Pancras, which stood at 243ft, was built in 1868, and has always been a cause for pride in British architecture. The structure had to be refurbished with precision and care as it had already suffered damage three times during the two World Wars by bomb attacks (PTS, 2009).
The overall aim of this project was to turn St Pancras into a commercial venture, which would accommodate the business of Eurostar and make the same a premier tourist attraction. The project successfully achieved completion in 2007 after a budget of £800 million spent on the construction and refurbishment (PTS, 2009). Today, the station stands proudly at the heart of London as the Eurostar travels at speeds of up to 208mph, transporting tourists and travellers to Paris and other European destinations in less than four hours (Muir, 2008).
Comparison of St Pancras and Spinnaker Tower
The query that then comes to mind is how St Pancras became a successful venture, unlike the ill-fated Spinnaker Tower. The very first factor here would be effective risk management and whether the project was effectively dealt with in terms of the possible building risks involved. These risks, as discussed above, would be dealing with an old and possibly frail piece of history, which had to be modernized without spoiling its structural integrity. At the same time, the project managers took care by utilizing experience and effective knowledge management, so that the current travellers or the neighbouring environment would not be disturbed (Atkinson et al, 2006). This is an example of good industrial practice, which has emerged in the previous few years within UK construction project management history (Baldry, 1998). Secondly, this project was well managed in terms of its scope as well as the aims, goals and objectives of the government in facilitating transport and generating tourism revenue.
Finally, the time management of the project, if not excellent to say the least, was realistic and well justified. Greed was not allowed to prevail of over good sense and good industrial practice, as in the Spinnaker saga, and so no money or expectations were lost when the project reached completion in 2007.This was also due to effective project procurement management by the managers in charge of acquisition and third party contracting as well as the overall administration of the project (Cicmil et al, 2006).
Discussion and conclusions
The way ahead is to understand that a project manager’s job is not only to plan, design and manage projects but to also take decisions, which are realistic and will not compromise the ultimate quality of the projects (Cicmil et al, 2006). Projects which cause disruption in timetables, delays and escalating costs, can become white elephants for the public purse and ultimately mean that public finances will suffer because of them (Atkinson et al, 2006). Spinnaker was only one of the many millennium projects destined to fail from the start due to overspending and government red tape. In this vein, the St Pancras project did better in terms of time and cost management as it combined the best of the private sector with governmental aims and objectives. This is not to say that the Spinnaker plan did not have government support, but that the private sector contribution to the project was less than perfect.
The main reasons at the heart of project failure in the public sector have been well documented by many academics in terms of project management and can be effectively summarized as the, “…. inability to deal adequately with complexity, uncertainty, the influences of the environments of projects, human error and other “soft” risks ” (White and Fortune, 2009:32).
At the same time, with reference to the nine given ingredients of project management success and with regards both of the examples discussed herein, it is important to realize that there is no exhaustive list of the do’s and don’ts of project management in the construction industry (Baldry, 1998). Many a times these ingredients must operate as a “formal system” and in continuity with each other to achieve project management success. White and Fortune (2009:35) have tried to explain it thus:
“ …(such a) system can be defined as an “organized whole” or a set of components that are interconnected and working together to achieve a purpose. The need for systems ideas was felt initially in the process industries where the large-scale integration of plant led to severe problems of design, management and maintenance. Because a system can be used as an abstract notion and applied to any situation, not just one that would popularly be labeled as a system, it can be used for gaining understanding of all types of projects (p.35)”.
Ideally, in the context of project management, the above would entail that such a system should take into account a proper decision making regime where there would be stress placed upon effective performance-monitoring of the any decision taken, whether in terms of the risks, costs or the human resource management (Cough et al, 2000). These decisions have to be effective, ethical and realistic, and form the very pith and substance of the nine ingredients of managerial success in construction projects.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be seen in terms of both examples discussed above that projects succeed or fail due to their management style, whether this is in terms of the management of risks, decisions, costs or quality. The nine ingredients do not exist in a vacuum and separate from each other, and must occur if not simultaneously, then at least in varying degrees during project completion. There is certainly no shortcut to project success and time delays have to be kept in perspective especially in public sector projects where the morale of the public is pinned upon their successful completion.
References
- Atkinson, R., Crawford, L., Ward, S. (2006), “Fundamental uncertainties in projects and the scope of project management”, International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 24 pp.687-98.
- Baldry, D. (1998), “The evaluation of risk management in public sector capital projects”, International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 16 No.1, pp.35-41.
- Cavendish, Penny and Martin, Martin D., Negotiating and Contracting for Project Management, Upper Darby, PA: Project Management Institute, 1982 [2nd printing, 1987].
- Cicmil, S., Williams, T., Thomas, J., Hodgson, D. (2006), “Rethinking project management: researching the actuality of projects”, International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 24 pp.675-86.
- Couillard, J. (1995), “The role of project risk in determining project management approach”, Project Management Journal, Vol. 26 No.4, pp.3-15
- Clough, Richard; Sears, Glenn & Keoki; Construction Project Management, 4th Edition, New York: John Wiley & Son, 2000
- Griffiths,A (2004),The Millennium Tower – a Jewel or a future public burden? On behalf of the Society for Cost Analysis and Forecasting available at http://www.scaf.org.uk/library/prespaper/The%20Spinnaker%20Tower.pdf.
- Muir,P(2008) The rebirth of St Pancras: matching service to facilities; Human Resource Management International Digest;Vol 16, Number 2,pp 11-16 ,Emerald Group Publishing Limited
- PTS (2009) St Pancras International case study prepared by PTS Consulting Available online at www.ptsconsulting.com/…/St%20Pancras%20International%20case%20study.pdf
- White,D and Fortune,J,The project-specific Formal System Model, International Journal of Managing Projects in Business,Vol 2, pp 36-52, Emerald Group Publishing Limited